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Abstract 
Why did developed societies not foresee the dilemma of reconciling equality 
and pluralism until now? This is the basic question the present paper asks 
and tries to answer. Yet before doing so it has to clarify three questions. 
First, the adjective ‘developed’ calls for some clarifications, in spite of the 
fact that it is frequently used both by experts and the lay public. Second, it 
is necessary to specify the sense in which the concepts equality and 
pluralism, are used. Third, the paper must provide the rationale for the 
compelling need for a New Agenda. 
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Let me begin by specifying the scope of my lecture. First, the adjective 
‘developed’ calls for some clarifications, in spite of the fact that it is 
frequently used both by experts and the lay public. Second, it is necessary 
to specify the sense in which the concepts equality and pluralism, are 
used. Third, I propose to ask and answer the question as to why developed 
societies did not foresee the dilemma of reconciling equality and pluralism 
until now. Finally, I must provide the rationale for the compelling need for a 
New Agenda. 
I. 
The imagery of societies is often projected in terms of their quality of life, 
which is a summation of both material and non-material dimensions. Thus 
in the U.N.D.P. Report of 1991 one gets three rankings/ratings, based on a) 
human development, b) human freedom, c) human distress.1 (See Table 1.) 
The table provides a profile of the top eighteen countries.  
It is clear form Table 1 that by and large the state-societies2 which 
scored ‘high’ on human development also have high scores on human 
freedom. But when one looks at the profile of human distress one notices 
substantial variations between these societies. A few general points may be 
noted here. First, with the exception of Japan, all the societies which figure 
in the table are populated predominantly by the Europeans.3 Second, of the 
seventeen European countries listed, seven (Australia, France, Austria, 
Italy, Spain, Greece, and Portugal) do not have a very depressing human 
distress profile. None of these societies are development toppers; in fact five 
of them are at the bottom of the development ranking, and three (scoring 30 
or less) have only medium ranking with regard to freedom.Third, of the seven 
countries with a relatively low human distress profile (among the seventeen 
European countries) five are predominantly Catholic, one is Orthodox and 
one is Protestant. 
It may not be too far fetched to suggest that Protestant individualism 
contributes to human distress! Fourth, the size factor does not seem to be 
significant in providing a better profile in regard to human distress as 
exemplified by the cases of Sweden, Denmark and Finland with just about 
5–8 million population each; small is not always beautiful! Fifth, the United 
States of America, the biggest and certainly the most heterogeneous of all 
societies which figure in the table , provides the most distressing profile of 
human distress. Finally, some of the societies might appear to have a 
positive profile with regard to human distress precisely because of the 
nature of the indicators used. More about this within a moment. 
Which of the states are more developed, those scoring a high rank on 
human development, or on human freedom, but a lesser one on human 
distress? If the answer is that ‘true development’ is achieved only when 
there is a confluence, if not a fusion, between development and freedom and 
only when human distress is negligible, if not completely absent, one is 
 
1 The indicators of human distress included in the U. N. D. P. Report are murders, suicides, 
rape, drug crimes, prisoners,pollution and unemployment. I have not incorporated the last 
item into table I., but that does not affect my argument. 
2 The term ‘nation-state’ assumes coterminality between state and nation. However, in the 
vast majority of the cases this is not true and hence it may be better to use the term ‘state-
society’. 
3 It may be noted that the present analysis applies the adjective ‘European’ not only to 
geographical Europe but also to those regions which have been colonized and appropriated by 
them, although, of course the reference is confined to the developed ones.  
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only postulating an ideal type and not grappling with the complexity of 
empirical reality. Therefore, the point at issue is not one of identifying 
praxiological lags from an assumed ideal type but that of an essential 
theoretical/conceptual gap. That is, one has to be clear about the very 
concept of a developed society. 
I suggest that two vital elements are ignored by the U.N.D.P. Report in 
constructing the quality of life index, namely a) disparity in income 
distribution and b) pluralism, that is, the attitude of the ‘ingroups’ towards 
the ‘outgroups’. 
I want to underline this point because in the context of material 
prosperity experienced in developed societies it is widely held that the 
majority of the population has become middle class, and even the wage 
workers have undergone the process of embourgeoisement. Consequently, 
the concern for disparity in incomes and increase in inequality has been 
dismissed as inconsequential by many. For example, Raymond Aron asked 
rhetorically: “If the basic needs are provided in an approximately similar 
way, what real difference is made by great fortunes or huge incomes ... ?” 
(1970:11). It does matter though because it is those who have huge 
incomes and great fortunes who set the modes of life-style by indulging in 
vulgar consumption patterns which, in turn is aspired to by an increasing 
proportion of the population, leading to their resorting to illegitimate means 
to achieve the socially approbated goals. Available evidence suggests that 
the gap between culturally valued goals and legitimate means to achieve 
them is an important source of crime and deviance, which in turn adversely 
affects the quality of life in society. 
In so far as developed societies remain largely homogeneous it is 
relatively easy to maintain a uniformly high standard of living or at least to 
keep disparity within a limited range but when societies are heterogeneous 
– racially and culturally – both of these may not be possible.4 Thus the 
disparity in incomes among the citizens of homogeneous Scandinavian 
countries was only to the tune of five to seven times during the heyday of 
social democracy, while in the highly heterogenous United States of 
America it is more than 300 times! Incidentally, this disparity is not recent 
and not the creation of Republicans.  
Affluent societies often need the presence of external elements. In 
1960’s and 1970’s one third of Switzerland’s labor force was constituted by 
foreign immigrant workers, who did all the menial jobs and spared the Swiss 
citizens from this ordeal. Switzerland is certainly not an exception, and the 
presence of foreign immigrant workers is found in all the affluent countries of 
 
4 It is necessary to clarify briefly the distinction between three types of societies: 
homogeneous, heterogeneous, and plural, as they are frequently referred to in the course of 
this lecture. All societies are stratified based on age, gender and class. But if a society’s 
population is drawn from the same race, ethnic group and/or nationality, it is viewed as 
homogeneous. Conversely, multi-racial, multi-national, multi-religious and polyethnic societies 
are referred to as heterogeneous societies. In the latter type of societies, there is a greater 
possibility of institutionalized inequality based on racism (South Africa, until recently) or caste 
(India, before 1947) which render them hierarchical societies. But a heterogeneous society 
need not be hierarchical as culturally diverse groups with socio-economic equality can co-exist. 
Both in the case of homogeneous and heterogeneous societies, however, the internality of the 
constituting elements are not questioned. Thus the American ‘Negro’, the Indian 
‘untouchable’ and the Greek slave were all accepted as essential and useful internal elements. In 
contrast, the internality of one or another segment in a plural society may be questioned, that 
is, a plural society is polarized between insiders and outsiders. Sometimes, the insiders may be 
marginalized (e.g. the First Nations in the New World) and sometimes the outsiders may be 
deprived of their rights (e.g. Indians in Fiji, or guestworkers in Western-Europe). It is 
necessary and useful to recognize the distinctions between these societies for the clarity of 
analysis.  
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Western Europe, which certainly affects the internal milieu of these 
societies. To quote Bottomore: 
The fact that these workers are citizens of another country, speak 
another language,and participate in a different culture, largely 
excludes them from political life in the countries where they work ... 
The most significant features are the growing heterogeneity of the 
working class as a result of ethnic diversity, and the creation of a 
distinct, socially isolated sub-proletariat (1971:395). 
That is, if disparity of incomes in a society goes beyond a certain range, if 
some sections of its population are marginalized and if the incidence of 
crime is substantial, the quality of life in such a society cannot be ‘high’; it 
should not be defined as ‘developed’. 
II. 
The appellation developed is intended to denote not only the level of material 
but also ideological advancement; the two important elements of ideology 
being equality and individualism. Of the two concepts – equality and 
individualism – the former is fairly widely understood and even accepted. 
And yet it needs to be noted that the two referents of equality – equality of 
opportunity and distributive equality – connote radically different ideological 
positions. Although equality of opportunity is almost universally endorsed, a 
minority argues that it does block the blooming and flowering of gifted 
individuals who should not be subjected to the notion of formal equality 
(see, Letwin (ed.) 1983), because in doing so societies are indulging in a 
self-denying ordeal in tapping the full potentialities available to them through 
extraordinary individuals. This aggressive individualism, bordering social 
Darwinism, seems to fit well with competitive capitalism, a feature of all 
developed societies. An inevitable corollary of this position is not to 
recognize any group-based or collectivity-oriented inequality. 
There are many more who oppose distributive equality because 
according to them it would sap the individuals of their vitality and motivation 
to work. However, the notion of basic or minimum needs (although there is 
no consensus on this) is increasingly endorsed in that all individuals, 
irrespective of their ability and contribution to society, are believed to be 
entitled to these needs. To put it differently, the notion of equality is 
conceptualized as providing the members of a society the opportunity to 
demonstrate their competence so that their entitlement to differential 
rewards is rendered legitimate. 
Equality and individualism are inextricably intertwined in their origin 
and development (see, Beteille 1986: 121–134). And yet, while equality of 
opportunity has apparently acquired universal recognition as a value, this 
cannot be said about individualism. To complicate matters, their relationship 
is not unilinear in that in some contexts they reinforce each other while in 
others they repel each other. Thus excessive individualism inevitably 
endangers the kernel of equality by fostering intense competition, which 
invariably leads to inequality. The defense which is proffered in favor of this 
process is that one can only ensure equality of opportunity which should 
necessarily lead to inequality of rewards. And, it is often argued, that only 
then would individuals be motivated to realize their full potentials. Thus the 
notion of individualism in the limited context of material rewards is ultimately 
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latched on to an incentive system which enables human beings to become 
unequal. 
But there are several difficulties here. First, it is impossible to provide 
equality of opportunity except in the formal-legal sense in so far as 
institutions, such as family, differential access to information and resource, 
etc., exist. Second, the very instruments through which equality is sought 
to be established (e.g. education) are often the instruments which reinforce 
the prevailing inequality. Third, the privileged in the system often honestly 
believe that they are inherently superior and the under-privileged are inferior. 
For these reasons, the notion of equality taken in conjunction with 
individualism is incapable of coping with the complex reality of 
heterogenous and plural societies. On the other hand, I suggest that the 
notion of equality along with the idea of pluralism is capable of coping with 
the situation. 
Pluralism is a much misunderstood concept and is used at least in two 
different senses. One set of authors following Furnival (1948) use the term 
to mean ‘co-existence’ of two or more segments of the population within a 
polity who produced and transacted goods and services but did not 
transfuse culture or blood (see Kuper and Smith (eds.) 1971). This form of 
‘pluralism’ exists in situations in which the collectivities involved are graded 
into superiors and inferiors. Pluralism here essentially means 
institutionalized inequality, the anti-thesis of authentic pluralism. Another 
set of authors following Tocqueville (1956) refers to pluralism as a condition 
which emerges through division of labor and social differentiation articulating 
as political interests (see Kornhauser 1960; Shils 1956). Here the reference 
could be, and often it is, to the attachment of different segments of 
population, within a polity, differentiated in terms of class, to different 
ideological orientations based on their material interests. This is the sense 
in which the notion of pluralism is often used in the case of developed 
heterogenous societies. When a developed society tends to maintain its 
boundary vis-a-vis those who are defined as inferior or outsider, it tends to 
become ‘plural’ in the Furnivalian sense. 
I suggest that pluralism should be conceptualized as a value-
orientation. When economic and political interests are articulated in 
heterogeneous societies by deprived sections of population , there is often a 
nexus between race, religion and language, on the one hand, and material 
interests, on the other. In such societies political parties or economic 
organizations may emerge to champion the cause of one or the other of 
these segments of population, or their combinations. These efforts are 
characterized as parochial at best and anti-national at worst by the state 
and the cultural mainstream. To put it pithily, heterogeneous societies have 
a qualitatively different type of pluralism which is essentially a value-
orientation that the different segments of population which constitute them 
should hold for one another. That is, pluralism presupposes heterogeneity 
and diversity. Therefore, there is no moment for pluralism to crystallize 
and/or to be articulated in a homogeneous society which in turn means that 
these societies need not and often did not recognize group-based 
inequality. Keeping these preliminary clarifications in mind let us look at the 
internal milieu of the developed societies populated by Europeans. Broadly 
speaking, the three revolutions gave birth to the Three Worlds. The 
bourgeois revolution produced the First World, the proletarian revolution 
produced the Second World and the colonial revolution produced the Third 
World. But some of the ex-colonies have undergone a double-revolution – 
colonial and bourgeois – and got incorporated into the First World (North-
America, Australia, etc.). Typically, these societies of the New World are 
racial and cultural extensions of the Old World. Be that as it may, the 
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internal social milieu of the societies of the New World is drastically 
different from that of the Old World. The manner in which the different 
segments of the population are incorporated into these societies accounts 
for this variation. 
The ‘new’ nations of the United States of America, Canada, Australia, 
etc., have different layers of populations which are racially and culturally 
different. First, all of them have the original inhabitants, (the First Nations) 
although their number and proportion remains substantially reduced today. 
Second, the dominant white migrants, with different socio-cultural layers 
based on religious (Protestant, Catholic, Jew) and linguistic background.  
Third, there is the non-white migrant population (mainly Asian), which 
arrived subsequently, in search of better opportunities. Fourth, we find the 
Black population, brought in initially as slaves. (This applies largely only to 
the U.S.). Given the different modes of incorporation, the structure of 
deprivation of these collectivities varies vastly. 
As against the settler majority countries of the New World, the 
situation in the Old World is qualitatively different in that the overwhelming 
majority of the population in each of the state-societies is native-born, they 
are nationals, that is those who have a moral claim over the territory which 
they inhabit. In contrast, the societies of the New World are poly-ethnic in 
that no segment, save the natives, have a moral claim on the territory to 
which they belong (see, Oommen 1989:279–305; 1994:26–46). 
Consequently, not only does the deprivation of the populations which 
constitute these societies vary but their composition too is different. Thus if 
the most deprived category in the developed state-societies of Western 
Europe are the immigrant workers, particularly those of different races, 
languages and religions, in the New World they are the Natives and the 
Blacks. Clearly then, the developed societies vary widely in terms of their 
internal social milieu and in terms of the building-blocks which compose 
them. 
As I see it, the challenge which is to be addressed by developed 
societies is the dilemma posed by the competing demands of equality and 
pluralism. The dilemma is not inherently irreconcilable but embedded in the 
very manner in which equality is sought to be defined and the nature of the 
unit invoked in establishing this equality, namely, the individual, ignoring the 
inequalities anchored to groups.  
I am now in a position to state my argument succinctly. I suggest that 
a) diversity/heterogeneity is a social fact and pluralism is an attitude, a 
value-orientation to that social fact; b) there is a qualitative difference in the 
meaning of equality and pursuantly of inequality in homogeneous and 
heterogeneous societies; c) the notion of equality sought to be established 
between individuals is conceptually inadequate to cope with the complexity 
of socially heterogeneous societies; d) the ongoing process of globalization, 
if it is understood and facilitated in the proper sense of the term5, is bound 
to render the developed societies more and more heterogeneous; e) 
therefore pluralism as a value-orientation is to be nurtured by these 
societies if they are to deserve the appellation developed and hence f) the 
dilemma that they face can be tackled only by combining the pursuit of 
individual-based equality with pluralism, a collectivity-oriented value through 
which inter-group equality is sought to be achieved. 
 
5 Globalization facilitates the untrammelled flow of capital from the developed to the less 
developed world, but developed countries try to prevent the flow of labor form the 
underdeveloped countries thereby blocking globalization. 
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III. 
Let me now turn to the third item of my agenda. Why is it that the 
developed societies did not face the dilemma between pluralism and 
equality until now? As I see it, the developed societies did not confront the 
irreconcilability between pluralism and equality earlier for the following 
reasons. First, empirically rooted social theory is hardly a couple of 
centuries old and it emerged and flourished mainly in the European world, 
and much of it developed only after World War II. As construction of social 
theory is geared to understand, analyze and/or to improve society, it is the 
immediate empirical reality of one’s own society which moulds one’s 
attempt to formulate social theory.6 Diversity was not a major feature of 
European ‘nation-states’ and where it existed the tendency to dominate was 
very strong on the part of the cultural mainstream. This obliterated the very 
possibility or the need to recognize pluralism. 
Second, the expression ‘nation-state’, a coinage which crystallized in 
Western Europe reflected the actual or hoped-for coterminality between 
nation and state, i.e. culture and polity, which made it possible to focus on 
the individuals as the unit in defining the value of equality. And wherever the 
rupture between culture and polity existed it was invariably ignored in the 
name of ‘national integration’, which in effect meant state-building at the 
cost of weak and minority nations within these state-societies. In fact, more 
often than not, the measures undertaken in the name of nation-building was 
actually an enterprise in nation-destruction (see, Connor 1971–72: 319–
355). 
Third, the presumed onward march of secularization and rationality 
assumed by the liberal expectancy and articulated through dichotomous 
constructions of social reality led to the untenable belief that ascriptive 
affiliations and primordial ties are bound to disappear from developed 
societies. The faith in the possessive individualism was reinforced by the 
belief in the existence of this process. However, the incessant search for 
tradition and roots, the re-discovery of primary groups the re-emergence of 
primordial collectivism and the persisting and virulent expression of social 
and cultural xenophobia disproved the above beliefs and assumptions (see, 
Van Den Berghe 1983: 238–252). 
Fourth, the excessive importance and privileged position assigned to 
class and class analysis in understanding the stratification system of 
developed industrial societies ignored the durable character of the elements 
of social structure such as race, religion and language. This point, seen in 
conjunction with point three above, reinforced the need and possibility of 
celebrating individualism a value, nay as a cult. 
Fifth, the developed societies are or happen to be Western and 
Christian, except for a few new entrants, such as Japan and the Asian 
Tigers, who are usually treated as aberrations, at best exceptions. This 
implied, although it was not always stated explicitly, that certain religious 
values promoted advancement. It is often argued that if Protestant ethic is 
accepted and ‘n’ achievement motivation is endorsed, others too will and 
can reach the same goal. In fact, some even suggest that Protestant-
Christianity , given its emphasis on the individual, is conducive to and 
nurtures democracy. Thus it is easy to see the nexus between capitalism, 
democracy and Protestant Christianity, as all three sacralize individualism. 
 
6 The discipline of social/cultural anthropology conceived as and devoted to the study of 
other societies was geared to civilize the ‘primitive’ and ‘backward’ societies and to facilitate 
colonial administration and christianization. While the study if other societies did eventually 
contribute to social theory, its initial aim was different. 
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However, it was Christianity which introduced the concept of equality for the 
first time in human history; not only equality of all human individuals in the 
eyes of God, but also of all ‘nations’ which were but branches of a more 
general humanity. The current over-emphasis on individualism is, therefore, 
somewhat paradoxical. 
Sixth, as pluralism and individual-based equality are believed to be 
conceptually irreconcilable, heterogeneity is defined and cognised as 
constituted by a continuum of inferior and superior elements, in fact, a 
hierarchy. Consequently, different physical types (races, if you prefer), 
religions (including denominations) and nations (linguistic collectivities with 
a territorial base) tend to get ordered into a hierarchy creating a 
superordinate/subordinate relationship which makes it impossible to apply 
the notion of equality to these groups. This is a conceptual trap into which 
Western social science has fallen, even if unwittingly. 
Finally, it needs to be stated that the conceptions of society held by 
monism and pluralism differ radically. If the monists envision a 
homogeneous society of the same race, or religion and/or speech 
community, pluralists seek to create a society of citizens with equal rights, 
opportunities and responsibilities, even if they are drawn from utterly 
different backgrounds. While the former insists that the individual should be 
the basic unit, the latter focuses on collectivities and communities. And 
hence, individual-collectivity relations need to be conceptualized differently 
when referring to a heterogeneous society, as they are more complex and 
indeed intricate. 
Let me recapitulate the threads of my argument so far, even at the risk 
of slight repetition. Individual-based equality is theoretically plausible and 
praxiologically tenable in homogeneous societies where classes, gender 
and age groups constitute the basic building blocks of social structure. That 
is, in those societies where the individual is the unit of decision-making, 
market economy and majoritarian democracy are practical propositions. But 
in heterogeneous societies collectivities as against the individual become 
the salient units of social structure and hence market economy and 
majoritarian democracy need to be tempered and adapted so as to avoid 
the intense competition which is dysfunctional particularly for the weak and 
the minorities. Pursuantly, equality as conceptualized in and applied to the 
former type is not entirely amenable for application in the latter. 
It is necessary to anticipate and answer a question, at this juncture, 
namely, what is the rationale in maintaining that there is a qualitative 
difference in the nature of inequality between homogeneous and 
heterogeneous societies? To answer this question, we need to note that 
there are essentially two sources of inequality: performance and perception. 
Generally speaking, inequality in homogeneous societies emanates out of 
differences in performance which can be improved and hence abolished 
through appropriate socialization within the family, inculcation of relevant 
values, adequate education, training, etc. That is, inequality in 
homogeneous societies can be done away with the help of appropriate 
social engineering. This is exemplified by the increasing mobility among 
classes, gender and age groups in most societies. That is, even if a group 
has been defined hitherto as inferior in performance, it is relatively easy to 
change this evaluation in homogeneous societies. 
Inequality in heterogeneous societies is largely based on the dominant 
collectivity’s perception of the quality of the performance of the dominated 
collectivity. This may have nothing to do with the actual quality of 
performance of the collectivity in question but the dominant collectivity’s 
cognition and evaluation about the dominated collectivity’s history and 
culture. Therefore, eradicating inequality in such societies is not simply a 
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matter of social engineering but largely one of redefining the dominant 
collectivity’s evaluation about the quality of performance of the dominated 
collectivity. If such a redefinition does not take place there are only three 
route to ‘solve’ the problem, all of which are geared to homogenization. The 
first is genocide; clearly the victims are the weak and/or minority. The 
second is liquidating heterogeneity through assimilation of the weak; the 
extreme measure being intermarriages. While intermarriage across diverse 
groups may be welcomed if done voluntarily, it cannot be advocated as a 
formal measure to achieve equality because this entails coercion. Third, 
bifurcation of the society into homogeneous units, that is secession, based 
on race, religion or language which clearly smacks of intolerance. If the first 
solution results in the physical annihilation of identity groups, the second 
solution leads to the annihilation of cultural diversity. The third assumes that 
the co-existence of diversity and crystallization of pluralism are impossible. 
I am making this point because the quest for homogenization is often 
viewed as a quest for equality, that is co-existence of social closure and 
equality is believed to have a greater chance as compared with the co-
existence of heterogeneity and equality. To put it differently, in nation-
states, that is mono-national states equality is pursued through the fusion 
of nationality and citizenship. In contrast, the nub of inequality in 
heterogeneous societies lies at the disjuncture between citizenship and 
nationality, the latter being defined in terms of membership in different 
racial, religious or language groups, not necessarily a correct definition. 
The oppressed and the exploited do not often accept the premise that 
the state is an impartial or final arbiter. They are not satisfied by simply 
asking the question, What is the state? but pose the problematique, Who is 
the state? That is, who weilds, power and authority. Thus decentralization of 
authority across primordial collectivities which are specific to heterogeneous 
societies is a much more vexatious process as compared with dispersal of 
power across classes, genders, or age-groups in homogeneous societies. 
That is, the constituent elements of a heterogeneous society may often 
pursue the goal of shared sovereignty, an untenable quest in homogeneous 
societies.7 In other words, the issues of equality takes a different direction 
in heterogeneous societies. Therefore it is not surprising that some would 
argue for the homogenization of societies because such societies are likely 
to be more egalitarian and participative. 
However, the proposition is not admissible for three reasons. First, to 
homogenize often means to establish the hegemony of the dominant 
collectivity, annihilation of the weak and minority collectivities or at the best 
their assimilation into an artificially contrived cultural mainstream, leading to 
the eclipse of their identity. Second, most state-societies, as they are 
constituted, draw their population from diverse sources. Therefore, 
annihilation and assimilation endanger the principles of maintaining diversity 
and developing pluralism. Third, contemporary societies are constantly 
exposed to alien influences and hence characterized by frayed edges and 
loose textures. If anything, the ongoing process of globalization would 
intensify this trend. In such a situation the only viable option is to 
accommodate diversity, foster pluralism and nurture inter-group equality. 
I have hinted above that in terms of heterogeneity and in terms of the 
mode of incorporation of the weak and minority elements into them, the 
developed European societies differ substantially. One may identify seven 
different situations in this context. First, the ‘Old World’ heterogeneous 
 
7 This is not to deny the fact that a homogeneous society may get divided into two or more 
sovereign states based on secular ideology. However, the natural affinity between the 
populations of these states will be maintained in spite of the artificial vivisection of the 
society. 
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state-societies in which the majority live in their traditional homelands. The 
prominent examples are the United Kingdom, Belgium, Spain, etc. Second, 
societies where nationals and migrants from equally developed societies live 
together, as exemplified by French migrants in Germany or vice versa. 
Third, nationals from the affluent countries of Europe and migrants from less 
developed countries of Europe, such as Greece, Portugal, Ireland, etc., who 
live together. Fourth, nationals from affluent countries of Europe and 
migrants of non-European backgrounds, particularly from Africa and Asia, 
living together. Fifth, migrants of the same race who are linguistically and/or 
denominationally different coming to live together in the ‘new nations’ as 
exemplified by the English and the French in Canada or a variety of 
European groups in the U. S.. Sixth, First-Nations, the original inhabitants 
of the New World, live along with their oppressive conquerors and dominant 
colonizers. Examples of these are afforded by Australia, Canada and the U. 
S. Seventh, the ex-slaves who were brought to the colonies and the 
dominant migrants who brought them, living together as in the case of the 
Blacks and Whites in the U. S. Clearly, some of these situations are more 
complex viewed in terms of the number of elements present. 
The seven situations listed above may be grouped into three from the 
perspective of the range of inequality prevalent in them. Situation 1, 2 and 5 
may be described as cultural diversity among equals. Situation 3 does pose 
the problem of inequality but in a mild form. However, situations 4, 6 and 7 
do pose serious problems of equality. That is, diversity need not 
automatically result in inequality, but it does so depending upon the 
background of the constituting elements and the modes of their 
incorporation.  
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IV. 
Let me conclude my presentation by attempting an answer to the question: 
What is the compelling need for the New Agenda? 
The radical rupture between tradition and modernity began in Europe 
with the emergence of the twin values of equality and individualism. The 
acceptance and practice of these values were possible only in relatively 
homogeneous societies. In fact, the very emergence of nation-states in 
Western Europe could be interpreted as a response to this need. But 
individual-based equality is conceptually inadequate and praxiologically 
untenable in heterogeneous societies till such time when inter-group 
equality is established, as the building blocks of such societies are often 
groups of different racial, religious and linguistic backgrounds, some of 
whom are subjected to cumulative inequality and oppression. Collectivity-
oriented equality should be established as a pre-requisite in such societies 
so that all the constituting collectivities are in a position to contribute their 
share in all contexts and at all levels to the running of the system. This in 
turn calls for the recognition and nurturing of pluralism as a value. 
Three historical and contemporary developments necessitate the above 
noted change in value orientation. First, European colonization which 
produced racially and culturally heterogeneous societies. second, the 
emergence of the European Union wherein the cultural heterogeneity is 
manifold, as compared with the relatively homogeneous ‘nation-states’ of 
Europe. Third, the ongoing process of globalization which necessitates the 
multi-directional flow and consequent co-existence of population with 
differing racial and cultural backgrounds. 
Given such a complex empirical scenario, pluralization, both within 
and across, of societies seems to be the only viable alternative. 
Pluralization is to be discerned temporally, regionally and culturally. By 
alluding to temporality I am suggesting that social reality is interlocked into 
the past-present-future syndrome. No society can or even needs to shed its 
tradition in its entirety; it should retain the assets in its tradition and nurture 
them. Similarly, no society can or should ignore the process of 
modernization but borrow selectively those elements of modernity which 
augment its quality of life. Viewed thus, pluralization is a process of 
synthesizing tradition and modernity; it avoids the prevalent widespread 
tendency of instant contemporization in the cognition of human reality. 
Second, societies have territorial dimensions, in spite of globalization 
and the emergence of ‘one world’; they are located in different regions with 
different ecological and environmental features. This spatial situational 
specificity produces ecological and environmental pluralism. Third, the 
above two in conjunction produce differences in economy, values, and 
institutions. Any society which wants to retain its authenticity, that is 
identity and specificity, should pursue the path of pluralization instead of 
jumping on the bandwagon of globalization. 
I must hasten to add here that the plea for pluralization is not an 
advocacy for relativization. Relativization is a project which insists on 
retaining all aspects of societies and cultures in their pristine purity. The 
ideology of relativism is inimical to the very process of transformation, it 
insists on the retention of tradition, irrespective of its content, perpetuating 
obscurantism and even fundamentalism. Pluralization, then, is a process 
different from both globalization which ignores the specificities of cultures 
and locales and relativization which insists on the retention of all aspects of 
tradition ignoring context and content. It is a selective, creative response to 
both globalization and localization. 
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Equality, to be authentic, will have to be conceptualized and practiced 
in the world of concrete reality, which is a diverse and heterogeneous one. 
No amount of commitment to the principle of equality by the privileged will 
make it viable from the perspective of the disadvantaged. Equality, to be 
authentic in a heterogeneous world, will have to be seen in conjunction with 
collective identity. This calls for situating the equality of collectivities and 
equality of individuals in a sequential chain. To insist on the latter without 
providing for the former, its pre-requisite, is to put the cart before the horse. 
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Table 1: 
Rank and Scores of Human Development, Human Freedom and Human 
Distress 
Country Estimated 
Populatio
n in 
Millions 
(1990) 
Human 
Developme
nt Ranking 
Human 
Freedom 
Index 
Ranking 
Profile of Human Distress 
Japan 123.5 1 32 Does not figure 
significantly on any item 
Canada  26.5 2 34 Drug crimes highest; 
second highest level of 
pollution 
Sweden   8.4 4 38 Murders, among the 
highest four countries; 
suicide, among the 
highest seven countries; 
rape, among the highest 
four countries 
Switzerland   6.6 5 34 13th in rank in terms of 
prisoners 
U.S.A. 249.2 7 33 Murders, the highest (11 
times the rate in Japan); 
8th highest rate in suicide; 
highest in terms of 
prisoners (10 times the 
rate of the Netherlands); 
the highest rate in rape 
(28 times the rate in 
Portugal); Drug crimes the 
third highest; pollution, the 
highest 
Netherlands  15.0 8 37 Second highest incidence 
of rape 
Australia  16.9 9 33 Does not figure 
significantly on any item 
France  56.1 10 35 Does not figure 
significantly on any item 
United 
Kingdom 
 57.2 11 32 Figures among the top 
nine countries with high 
incidence of suicides 
Denmark   5.1 12 38 Figures in the top four 
countries with the highest 
incidence of murders; 
ranks fifth in drug crimes 
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Finland  5.0 13 36 Figures in the top five in 
the incidence of murders; 
figures among the top 
seven in regard to the 
incidence of suicides; 
ranks third with regard to 
the incidence of rape 
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Country Estimated 
Populatio
n in 
Millions 
(1990) 
Human 
Developme
nt Ranking 
Human 
Freedom 
Index 
Ranking 
Profile of Human Distress 
West-
Germany 
 61.8 14 35 Figures among the top 
seven in regard to the 
incidence of suicides; 
ranks third with regard to 
pollution 
Belgium  9.8 16 35 Figures among the top 
seven in regard to suicides 
Austria  7.6 17 36 Does not figure 
significantly on any item 
Italy  57.1 18 29 Does not figure 
significantly on any item 
Spain  39.2 20 26 Does not figure 
significantly on any item 
Greece  10 24 31 Does not figure 
significantly on any item 
Portugal  10.3 36 30 Does not figure 
significantly on any item 
 
Explanatory notes: 
1. Worked out on the basis of data/information available in U.N.D.P.,  
Human Development Report 1991, Oxford, 1991. 
2. Only countries with a population of five million or more are included in 
the table. 
3. The Human Freedom Index assigns one score to each item of freedom 
protected and a ‘zero’ to each item violated, the total number of items 
being 40. Countries ranking between 31–40 are taken to be having a high 
freedom ranking, but the highest score secured by any country is 38. 
4. The profile with regard to human distress is worked out based on units of 
100,000 population, i.e., how many murders, suicides, rape, etc. per 
that unit of population. 
